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ABSTRACT

Many sectors of the United States economy have
experienced deregulation during the 1970s and 1980s.

This

study examines how deregulation affects the
informativeness of accounting earnings of firms in
deregulation industries.

In this study, the

informativeness of accounting earnings is measured by the
earnings response coefficient (ERG, the slope coefficient
in the regression of abnormal stock returns on unexpected
accounting earnings).

The effects of deregulation on ERCs

are examined by (1) comparing ERCs before deregulation to
those after deregulation to determine the changes in the
magnitude of ERCs due to deregulation,

(2) investigating

the time series of ERCs after deregulation to determine
the intertemporal variation of ERCs following
deregulation, and (3) comparing the change in ERCs in one
deregulated industry to that in another deregulated
industry to determine the differential effects of
deregulation.
Results indicate that changes in the magnitude of
ERCs due to deregulation and differences in the changes in
the magnitude of ERCs among the three industries examined
are found in some cases but only when variables found to
be determinants of ERCs in previous studies are not
iv
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included in the regression models.

In other words, after

controlling for the effects of covariates, no evidence is
found for a significant impact of industry deregulation on
ERCs.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

Many sectors of the United States economy have
experienced deregulation during the 1970s and 1980s.

This

deregulation encompasses diverse industries such as
airline, natural gas, and trucking.

While the main goal

of deregulation is to improve the performance of the
affected industries by stimulating competition,
deregulation also increases investor uncertainty about
future prospects for the firms in the affected industries.
A number of studies (e.g., Bundt et al. 1992; Chen and
Sanger 1985; Fraser and Kannan 1990) find empirical
evidence of increases in systematic risk associated with
deregulation.

However, Cunningham et al.

(1988) find that

for airline industry the increase in systematic risk was
temporary, and it was followed by a period in which
systematic risk fell to a level below or about equal to
that in the regulated period.
While a number of prior studies investigate the
impact of deregulation on the risk of deregulated firms,
this study examines how deregulation affects the
informativeness of accounting earnings of firms in
deregulated industries.

In this study, the

informativeness of accounting earnings is measured by the
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earnings response coefficient (ERC, the slope coefficient
in the regression of abnormal stock returns on unexpected
accounting earnings).

The ERC is the magnitude of the

share price response per unit of unexpected earnings.
Earnings numbers of firms with large ERCs are more
informative than those of firms with small ERCs because
for any given unexpected earnings, relative share price
responses of firms with large ERCs will be higher than
those of firms with small ERCs.

The effects of

deregulation on ERCs are examined by; (1) comparing ERCs
before deregulation to those after deregulation to
determine the changes in the magnitude of ERCs due to
deregulation,

(2) investigating the time series of ERCs

after deregulation to determine the intertemporal
variation of ERCs following deregulation, and (3)
comparing the change in ERCs in one deregulated industry
to that in another deregulated industry to determine the
differential effects of deregulation.
To implement these examinations, a sample of firms
are obtained from the Value Line Investment Survey.
Regression models are developed to test the hypothesized
effects of deregulation on ERCs.

Variables found to be

determinants of ERCs in previous research are included in
some of the regression models to control for the effects
of these variables on ERCs.
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Motivation
Beginning with the seminal work of Ball and Brown
(1968), many studies provide evidence of a positive
correlation between unexpected earnings and unexpected
stock returns.*

The results of these studies strongly

support the hypothesis that accounting earnings numbers
contain information relevant for security valuation.
However, a simple regression of unexpected returns on
unexpected earnings generally explains only a small
portion of the variations of unexpected returns around
earnings announcement dates.

Hagerman et al. (1984)

suggest that the low explanatory power indicates that
factors other than the magnitude of unexpected earnings
affect the stock price responses to earnings
announcements, and this study investigates whether
deregulation is such a factor.

Identification of factors

affecting the magnitude of stock price responses to
earnings announcements provides insight into whether and
how information (e.g. whether the firm is in a regulated
industry or not) affects the way accounting numbers are
utilized by stock market participants in firm valuation.
This study hypothesizes that deregulation affects
both cross-sectional and intertemporal variations of ERCs.

‘See, for example. Brown and Kennelly (1972), Latané
and Jones (1977, 1979), Beaver et al. (1979), Rendleman et
al. (1982), Hagerman et al. (1984), among others.
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Prior studies have found that ERCs are related to various
firm-specific factors (e.g., earnings persistence,
Kormendi and Lipe 1987) and changes in macroeconomic
conditions (e.g., risk-free interest rates, Collins and
Kothari 1989).

However, the firm-specific factors and the

changes in macroeconomic conditions studied affect either
the cross-sectional or intertemporal variation of ERCs,
but not both.

This study adds to this line of literature

by suggesting a factor which potentially affects both
cross-sectional and intertemporal variations of ERCs.
Moreover, a number of prior studies examine the
impact of deregulation on firm systematic risk.

This

study extends prior research by examining the effects of
deregulation in a different area: the informativeness of
accounting earnings.

Determination of whether

deregulation affects the stock price responses to earnings
announcements is informative about the effects of
deregulation.

Many important industries of the U.S.

economy were deregulated during the 1970s and 1980s, and
it is possible that other industries will be deregulated
in the future.

Therefore, it is important to understand

the impact of deregulation.
Furthermore, this study can also help validate the
results of two prior studies.

First, Teets (1992) finds

that on average, ERCs of electric utilities are
significantly less than those of nonregulated firms, and
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he suggests that regulation is a determinant of ERCs.
However, as acknowledged by Teets (1992, 284), since only
one regulated industry is included in his study, it is
difficult to determine whether "regulation per se or some
other characteristic of [electric] utilities" is
responsible for the smaller ERCs.

This study represents a

more direct test of the hypothesis that regulation is a
determinant of ERCs by comparing ERCs before deregulation
to those after deregulation.

Therefore, it should provide

further evidence as to the validity of Teets's assertion.
Secondly, Lang (1991) finds evidence of a decline in
the magnitude of the ERCs over time following firms'
initial public offerings.

Lang (1991, 231) suggests that

his model could be applied to other situations, and in
particular to events "which substantially increase
investor uncertainty about the future prospects of the
firm (e.g., industry deregulation ... )."

By

investigating the time series of ERCs after deregulation,
this study should provide insight into the
generalizability of Lang's model.
Historical Background of Regulation
Airlines
Congress adopted the Civil Aeronautics Act in 1938.
This Act created the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) to
regulate interstate air carriers.

In order to engage in

scheduled airline service, a firm had to first obtain a
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certificate of public convenience and necessity from the
CAB.

The certificate specified which routes could be

served.

Applicants of certificates had to show that

proposed services were "in the public interest and that
they would not harm the incumbent carriers" (Kaplan 1986,
42) .

The CAB approved a very low percentage of route

authority applications by existing airlines to serve new
routes or routes served by other carriers (Slovin et al.
1991, 233) .

In addition, as airlines were required to

serve routes listed on their certificates, they could not
discontinue routes without CAB approval.

Therefore,

airlines had little flexibility on what routes they
served.
In regulating fares, the CAB's primary concern was on
the overall industry profitability rather than on the
relationship between fares and costs in particular
markets.

The CAB used distance as the primary factor in

determining fares while the actual cost per passenger mile
of providing air service declines with distance.

As a

result, fares in long-haul markets were above the costs of
service while fares in short-haul markets were kept below
costs (Kaplan 1986, 43).
Beginning in 1976, the CAB started to reduce its
control over airfares and routes, and with public support
for deregulation, the Airline Deregulation Act was signed
into law in October 1978 (Kaplan 1986, 45) .

The Act ended
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the CAB'S authority over routes on December 31, 1981, and
its authority over fares on January l, 1983.

The Act also

ratified the liberal fare flexibility and route award
policies that the CAB had already adopted.

For the most

part, the CAB's regulation on fares and routes ended
sooner than mandated in the Airline Deregulation Act
(Kaplan 1986, 47) .
With increased fare flexibility, carriers have
adopted a variety of pricing strategies.

These include

restricted discount fares, quantity discounts, and
frequent flyer discounts.
related.

Prices have become more cost

Moreover, carriers' route structures are no

longer restricted by the CAB.

Instead, carriers engage in

overall planning of their routes so as to use their
resources most efficiently.

They emphasize the

development of hub-and-spoke operations at major
airports.-

Hub-and-spoke operations allow carriers to

combine passengers with different origins and
destinations, thus increase loads and reduce operating
costs.

Hub-and-spoke operations have intensified service

competition in most markets nationwide (Slovin et al.
1991, 237).

In addition, a number of carriers began to

provide interstate air service after deregulation.

These

^In a hub-and-spoke route network, flights from
different origins arrive at an intermediate airport, and
passengers will then change airplanes and go on to their
final destinations.
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included former intrastate carriers and totally new
carriers.

Deregulation brought freedom in setting prices

and establishing routes to airlines.

But, it also

intensified the competition and increased uncertainty in
the operating environments for all carriers.
Natural Gas
The natural gas industry first became subject to
federal regulations when Congress passed the Natural Gas
Act in 1938.

This legislation brought the interstate

transmission of natural gas and its sale for resale under
the control of the Federal Power Commission.

In 1954 the

Federal Power Commission's regulatory powers were extended
to include prices charged by producers at wellheads by the
Supreme Court's ruling in the Phillips Petroleum Company
vs. Wisconsin case.

However, natural gas sold in

intrastate markets remained unregulated because the
Natural Gas Act of 1938 and the Supreme Court decision
applied only to natural gas sold in interstate markets
(Chen and Sanger 1985, 38).
Before 1970, no shortages of natural gas were
observed either in the interstate or intrastate markets.
However, as the consumption of natural gas increased,
prices of natural gas increased.

Large price differences

arose between the interstate and intrastate markets since
natural gas sold within state lines was not subjected to
price ceilings set by the Federal Power Commission.
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9
result of the natural gas shortages, some industries cut
back production and many people lost their jobs.
situation worsened each year.
reform became clear.

The

The need for regulatory

After more than a year of debate,

the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 was passed.

Under the

Act, federal natural gas regulation was extended to gas
sold in intrastate markets.

Meanwhile, the Act partially

deregulated the prices at which producers could sell
natural gas to pipelines at wellheads.

The majority of

new gas (gas from wells drilled after February 19, 1977)
were deregulated in January of 1985.

One exception was

that gas produced from "high cost" sources was deregulated
on November 1, 1979.

Old gas (gas from wells drilled on

or before February 19, 1977) remained regulated
indefinitely, but with price ceilings indexed to inflation
(Chen and Sanger 1985, 39-40).
Natural gas markets had always been vulnerable to
random shocks as a result of changes in weather, level of
economic activities or prices of alternative fuels.

But,

during most of the 1970s, these shocks seldom translated
into revenue risks for producers, pipelines and
distributors because of price ceilings and excess demands.
By eliminating wellhead price ceilings, the Natural Gas
Policy Act of 1978 increased the uncertainty faced by
producers and pipelines.

Wellhead price deregulation

changed the way producers sold gas and the way pipelines

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

10
bought gas.

Prices were determined by market forces and

therefore were subject to random shocks.

Along with

higher uncertainty, deregulation also created new
opportunities.

Producers could explore and develop

resources that would not have been economic under pre
deregulated price ceilings.

On the other hand, pipelines

could seek out new markets, as they are no longer
restricted by inadequate supplies.
Trucking
Federal government control was extended to motor
carriers in 1935 when the Motor Carrier Act was signed
into law.

Of the major provisions of the Act, those

affecting entry had been most important in shaping the
structure of the industry.

The burden of proof was on

applicants to show that their proposed services were or
would be "required by the present or future public
convenience and necessity" (Anderson and Huttsell 1989,
16).

Therefore, it was difficult for motor carriers to

extend their operations.

Rates were also strictly

controlled by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC).
From the beginning, the economic regulation of motor
carriers was criticized on the grounds that the industry
was inherently competitive (Moore 1986, 17).

In 1975,

President Gerald Ford called for legislation to reduce
trucking regulations, and with changes in the ICC
membership, significant regulatory reform began in 1977
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(Kahn 1979, 5).
restrictive.

Entry and rate controls became less

By 1979, the ICC had almost totally

deregulated the industry by substantially reinterpreting
the law in the direction of reduced regulation (Moore
1986, 21).

Recognizing the uncertainty felt by the

trucking industry. Congress concluded that the ICC should
be given explicit direction for regulation of the trucking
industry (Harper 1980, 7).

On July 1, 1980, the Motor

Carrier Act of 1980 was signed into law.
The Motor Carrier Act of 1980 substantially relaxed
entry control in the trucking industry.

Its most

significant provision was to shift the burden of proof
from the applicants to the protestors.

In other words, an

operating authority will be granted unless the protestors
show that the proposed service will be inconsistent with
the public convenience and necessity (Harper 1980, 9).

In

fact, of the 28,414 applications for new or expanded
operating rights in 1981, the commission approved 97
percent of them (Felton 1989, 145).

In addition, many

other operating restrictions were either eliminated or
reduced.
The Act also relaxed rate regulations.

It created a

zone within which the ICC might "not investigate, suspend,
revise or revoke any rate proposed by a motor carrier ...
on the grounds that such rate is unreasonable" (Harper
1980, 19).

The zone of rate freedom was 10 percent above
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or below the rate in effect one year prior to the proposed
change.

Furthermore, the Act restricted the activities of

motor carrier rate bureaus, and in so doing reduced the
effectiveness of these bureaus in controlling rate
competition.

Perhaps the best indicator of the impact of

the regulatory reform on the trucking industry is the loss
in the value of operating authorities.

The average

selling price of the authorities fell from over $350,000
in 1978 to below $20,000 in 1981 (Moore 1986, 30).
Regulatory reform in the trucking industry subjects these
carriers to a more competitive and uncertain operating
environment as the number of carriers increases and as
carriers are granted additional operating authorities.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
Chapter two discusses literature relevant to the study.
Chapter three describes the hypotheses and the methods
used.

Chapter four provides the empirical findings of the

study, and chapter five contains a summary and concluding
remarks.
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CHAPTER TWO
RELEVANT RESEARCH

This chapter reviews the research literature relevant
to this study.

Section one reviews research on the

associations of accounting earnings and stock returns.
Section two reviews research on the effects of
deregulation.
Associations of Accounting Earnings and Stock Returns
The relationship between accounting earnings and
stock returns has been one of the most researched areas in
the recent accounting literature.

Ball and Brown (1968)

began this line of research by examining the associations
between unexpected annual earnings and the 12-month
abnormal returns covering the period before the earnings
announcements.

They find that firms with higher than

expected earnings experienced positive abnormal returns
and firms with lower than expected earnings experienced
negative abnormal returns.

Since then, numerous studies

have extended Ball and Brown's study.

The findings are

generally consistent with the notion that the signs as
well as the magnitudes of unexpected earnings are
positively associated with abnormal returns.

However, a

simple regression of abnormal returns on unexpected
earnings generally explains only a small portion of the
13
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variations of abnormal returns around earnings
announcement dates.

For example, Hagerman et al.

(1984)

regress five-day cumulative abnormal returns around
quarterly earnings announcement dates on the proportional
changes in the quarterly earnings per share, and the
coefficient of determination (R^) is only 5%.

These

authors suggest that the low explanatory power of the
model indicates that factors other than the magnitude of
unexpected earnings affect the stock price responses to
earnings announcements.
The literature of identifying factors affecting stock
price responses to earnings announcements can be divided
into two main areas in terms of the theoretical frameworks
on which the studies were based:

(1) information economics

based valuation models and (2) time-series based valuation
models (see Cho and Jung 1991b for details).
Information Economics Based Valuation Models
The models developed by Choi (1985), Holthausen and
Verrecchia (1988), and Lev (1989) basically use the same
form of information system.

These models assume that the

value (or the price) of a firm is a linear function of
future cash flows (or dividends) which are normally
distributed with mean

fi

and variance a^.

Earnings signals

are assumed to communicate the true future cash flows (or
dividends) perturbed by noise

e.

The random variable e is

assumed to have a normal distribution with mean zero and
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variance 0^.

The reciprocal of the variance, 1/0%,

represents the quality of the earnings signal.

Given this

simplified setting, the price revision around earnings
announcements (Ap) is given by:
Ap = [anV (aV+0^) ]*[y-E(y) ]

(1)

where a>0 is a scale factor that converts cash flows (or
dividends) to earnings, y is the reported earnings, and
E(y) is the expected earnings.

Scaling both sides of

equation (1) by the price immediately prior to the
earnings announcement indicates that the ratio aa^/(aV+0^)
is the ERC.

Differentiating the ERC with respect to

(the prior uncertainty with respect to the firm's future
cash flows or dividends) and 0^ (the variance of the noise
in the earnings signal) respectively implies that the ERC
is positively related to

and negatively related to 0^.

The last relationship implies that the ERC is positively
related to 1/0^ (the quality of the earnings signal).
Based on these results, empirical studies hypothesize
that ERCs increase with the uncertainty about the firm's
future cash flows and with the quality of the firm's
reported earnings.

Most of these studies examine the

effect of a certain event in the informativeness of
earnings as measured by ERCs.
Change in Uncertainty of Future Cash Flows
Cho and Jung (1991a) investigate the effects of a
merger on the information content of earnings
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announcements.

They report a significant reduction in the

information content after the merger for firms whose
uncertainty about future earnings prospects is reduced by
the merger.
Collins and DeAngelo (1990) examine the stock market
reactions to earnings announcements of firms engaged in
proxy contests.

They argue that a proxy contest increases

investor uncertainty about who would manage the firm in
the future and hence about the firm's future cash flows.
They find that ERCs significantly increase during a proxy
contest and suggest that earnings released during a proxy
contest are very useful in resolving investor uncertainty
about the firm's future cash flows.
Change in Earnings Quality
Bandyopadhyay (1994) compares the ERCs of firms using
the successful efforts accounting method and those using
the full cost method.

He argues that earnings quality of

successful efforts firms is higher than that of full cost
firms.

However, the finding of his study is sensitive to

time periods.

Specifically, ERCs of firms using the

successful efforts method, on average, exceed those of
firms using the full cost method during 1982-1985 but not
during 1986-1990.
Choi and Jeter (1992) examine the effects of
qualified audit opinions on ERCs.

They hypothesize that

ERCs decrease in the post-qualification periods because a
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qualified audit opinion has the potential to adversely
affect the stock market's perception of the quality of the
earnings numbers generated by the firm.

The results are

consistent with their prediction that ERCs decline
subsequent to the issuance of the qualified audit
opinions.

However, other firm characteristic changes such

as the decrease in earnings persistence can also
contribute to the observed results.
Collins and Salatka (1993) examine the effects of
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No.52
on firms' earnings quality.

They find that ERCs increased

following the implementation of SFAS No.52 for those firms
whose accounting for foreign currency gains and losses is
most affected by the new standard.

The results are

interpreted to suggest that earnings produced under SFAS
No.52 were perceived by stock market participants to be of
higher quality than those produced under the old
accounting standard.
Rao (1989) examines the intertemporal variation of
ERCs following the firms' initial public offerings.

She

hypothesizes that ERCs increase over time following
initial public offerings because of the improvement in the
quality of the earnings signals.

Consistent with her

prediction, ERCs increase as the firms' stocks are
seasoned.
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Time-Series Based Valuation Models
Collins and Kothari (1989) start with an equity
valuation model in which price is modeled as the
discounted present value of future expected dividends, and
they assumefuture expected dividends are
current earning

related to

as:

k—If 2, .. . ®
where

is theexpectation

at time t of dividends to

be received at the end of period t+k and
reported earnings for period t.

(2)

is the firm's

Then, price is expressed

as a function of earnings:
-

'

(3)

Jc=i

where E (R^+j) is the expected rate of return from the end of
period t+j-1 to the end of period t+j.

Therefore, the

unexpected return associated with unexpected earnings is
derived as:

where UXt=Xt-E,.i (X^) is the unexpected earnings in period t.
Therefore, the ERG is a function of A^+^'s and the expected
rate of return.

Since expected rate of return is a

positive function of systematic risk and the risk-free
interest rate under the capital asset pricing model,
Collins and Kothari (1989) conclude that the ERC is a
decreasing function of systematic risk and risk-free
interest rate.

Furthermore, they argue that A,+k's are
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increasing functions of earnings persistence and growth
opportunities; therefore, the ERC is positively related to
the earnings persistence and growth opportunities.
Lang
the

(1991) models the

ERC as a positive function of

level of uncertainty about the time-series process of

earnings.

He derives the ERC using a model similar to

Collins and Kothari (1989) but he assumes that earnings
are

equal to dividends, and

walk with

drift time series

that earnings follow a random
process.

Investors are

assumed to learn about the unknown drift parameter over
time from the observed time series of earnings.

As a

result, the uncertainty about the firm's value decreases
over time as a longer earnings series is available to
estimate the unknown drift parameter.

Predictions from

Lang's model is that the ERC decreases over time following
the date the firm begins trading publicly or following
events (e.g., industry deregulation) which signal that the
information in the past earnings series may not be
relevant anymore in predicting future earnings.
Kormendi and Lipe (1987) and Easton and Zmijewski
(1989) also use time-series based valuation models to
derive determinants of the ERC.

The predictions from

these studies are that the ERC is a positive function of
earnings persistence and a negative function of systematic
risk.
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Many empirical studies examine the hypothesized
relationships between ERCs and the variables identified in
these time-series based valuation models.

The variables

investigated include earnings persistence, systematic
risk, risk-free interest rate, growth opportunities,
uncertainty about the earnings process, and industry
effects.
Earnings Persistence
Earnings persistence measures the degree to which
current period earnings shocks persist in the future.
Earnings persistence is typically measured by estimating
an autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) time
series earnings process.

Studies consistently report that

earnings persistence is significantly positively
correlated with ERCs (Collins and Kothari 1989; Dhaliwal
and Reynolds 1994; Easton and Zmijewski 1989; Kallapur
1994; Kormendi and Lipe 1987; Lipe 1990).
Teets (1992) differs from the previous studies in
that he examines regulation as one possible economic
determinant of earnings persistence.

He finds that the

average ERC of regulated electric utilities is
significantly less than that of nonregulated firms.

With

the assumption of a positive relation between the ERC and
persistence, he suggests that the result is consistent
with the view that earnings persistence is lower for
utilities than for nonregulated firms.
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Systematic Risk
Collins and Kothari (1989) and Lipe (1990) find
evidence of a significant negative correlation between the
ERC and systematic risk.

However, Easton and Zmijewski

(1989), Jeter and Chaney (1992), Ahmed (1994), and
Kallapur (1994) do not find the negative correlation to be
significant.
Risk-Free Interest Rate
Using yields on long-term U.S. Government bonds as a
proxy for the risk-free interest rate, Collins and Kothari
(1989) find significantly negative association between
ERCs and risk-free interest rates.
Growth Opportunities
Using market-to-book equity ratios as the proxy,
Collins and Kothari (1989) find growth opportunities to be
positively associated with ERCs.

However, Ahmed (1994),

using a different proxy (the ratio of stock of research
and development expenditures to replacement cost of
property, plant, and equipment), find a negative
association between ERCs and growth opportunities.
Uncertainty About the Earnings Process
Lang (1991) examines how changes in the level of
uncertainty about the time-series process of earnings
affect ERCs.

He compares ERCs over a 12-quarter period

following initial public offerings.

The results are

consistent with the prediction of his model that ERCs
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decrease over time following the date the firm begins
trading publicly.
Industry Effects
Biddle and Seow (1991) investigate the relationship
between industry characteristics and ERCs based on the
relationship between these characteristics and earnings
persistence or systematic risk.

They find significant

positive correlation between ERCs and barriers-to-entry
and significant negative correlation between ERCs and
financial leverage.
Firm Size
In addition to the variables mentioned above, firm
size is another widely tested variable in the
earnings/return correlation literature.

Freeman (1987)

finds evidence consistent with an inverse relationship
between ERCs and firm size.

However, Dempsey (1989) finds

that the firm size effect disappears with analyst
following.

In addition, Easton and Zmijewski (1989) and

Ahmed (1994) also do not find ERCs to be significantly
correlated with firm size.
Deregulation
Many sectors of the U.S. economy have experienced
considerable deregulation during the late 1970s and 1980s.
In 1977, 17 percent of the U.S. gross national product
(GNP) was produced by industries which were fully
regulated, and by 1988 that total was only 6.6 percent of
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GNP (Winston 1993, 1263).

Industry deregulation subjects

firms to a new operating environment.

Some firms are more

successful in adjusting to the new environment and in
taking advantage of the new opportunities.

Others may not

be as fortunate and may be made worse off by deregulation.
However, Winston (1993, 1284) argues that the overall
welfare effect of deregulation on society is significantly
positive (his estimate of the gains is about $40 billion
annually).
With regard to the effects of deregulation on firm
risk, there are two different views.

Following the

arguments of Peltzman (197 6 ) regarding regulation, one
view suggests that deregulation increases the impact of
demand and cost shocks on the industry, and thus increases
the variability of profits and the risk of the affected
firms.

On the other hand, Joskow and MacAvoy (1975)

assert that regulators are slow to act in response to cost
and demand shocks, so that nonregulated firms react to
these shocks more quickly; thus, they argue that
deregulation reduces rather than increases the risk of the
affected firms.
A number of studies have examined empirically the
impact of deregulation on the risk of the deregulated
firms.

Bundt et al. (1992) examine the effects of the

Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control
Act of 1980 on the market risk of the U.S. banking
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industry.

The estimated average change in systematic risk

associated with deregulation for the portfolio of 27 bank
holding companies is positive and significant.
Furthermore, nonsystematic risk is also found to have
increased after deregulation.
Chen and Sanger (1985) examine the impact of the
deregulation of the U.S. natural gas industry provided by
the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978.

They find significant

increases in the systematic risks of natural gas
producers, distributors, and firms in some natural gas
related industries (bituminous coal mining and machinery
industries) around the time of passage of the Act.

In

addition, Fraser and Kannan (1990) and Pettway et al.
(1988)

also find empirical evidence of increases in

systematic risk associated with deregulation.
On the other hand, Cunningham et al. (1988) analyze
the impact of deregulation of the U.S. airlines industry
in 1978, and find that systematic risk of airlines
increased in the period (of about one year) immediately
after deregulation.

But the increase was temporary, and

it was followed by a period in which systematic risk fell
to a level below or about equal to that in the regulated
period.
Summary
Chapter two discusses research relevant to this
study.

Research on the associations of accounting
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earnings and stock returns is reviewed.

Studies

identifying factors affecting stock price responses to
earnings announcements and the two theoretical frameworks
on which these studies are based are discussed.

The two

theoretical frameworks are the information economics based
valuation models developed by Choi (1985), Holthausen and
Verrecchia (1988), and Lev (1989) and the time-series
based valuation models developed by Collins and Kothari
(1989), Easton and Zmijewski (1989), Kormendi and Lipe
(1987), and Lang (1989).

Many empirical studies examine

the hypothesized relationships between ERCs and variables
identified in these models.

The findings of these studies

are generally consistent with the predictions that ERCs
are positively related to the uncertainty about future
cash flows and earnings persistence and negatively related
to the quality of the earnings signal.

However, empirical

evidence of the effects of other variables (including
systematic risk, risk-free interest rate, growth
opportunities, uncertainty about the earnings process,
barriers-to-entry, financial leverage, and firm size) on
ERCs is either mixed or sparse.

The chapter concludes

with a review of the research on the effects of
deregulation.

A number of studies find empirical evidence

of increases in systematic risk associated with
deregulation.

However, Cunningham et al. (1988) find that

for the airline industry the increase in systematic risk
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was temporary, and it was followed by a period in which
systematic risk fell to a level below or about equal to
that in the regulated period.
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CHAPTER THREE
RESEARCH METHOD

This chapter discusses the research methodology used
in this study. Section one discusses the research
hypotheses.

Data sources are described in section two.

The final section describes the statistical procedures
used to test the research hypotheses.
Research Hypotheses
Hypothesis One
Peltzman (1976) argues that the presence of
regulation reduces the impact of demand and cost shocks on
the industry.

His argument is that if costs rise,

regulators will allow the firm to increase prices so that
profits are not affected, and on the other hand, if costs
fall, regulators will ask the firm to reduce prices so
that the firm does not earn too much profit.

The results

are that earnings of regulated firms will not fluctuate
too much, and thus the level of uncertainty of regulated
firms' future earnings or cash flows is relatively low.
However, with the deregulation of the industry, protection
given by the regulators ceases to exist.

Some firms may

be able to take advantage of the opportunity created by
deregulation.

Others may not be able to adjust to the new

environment quickly.

Thus, deregulation increases the
27
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level of uncertainty of the deregulated firms' future
earnings or of the firms' future cash flows.
The theoretical models of Choi (1985) ,

Holthausen and

Verrecchia (1988), and Lev (1989) suggest that stock price
responses to value-relevant information are a function of:
(1 ) the uncertainty in the firms' value-relevant cash
flows and (2 ) the variance of the noise in the information
signal.

In particular, as related to this study, the

implications of these models are that ERCs are positively
related to uncertainty associated with the future cash
flows and negatively related to the variance of the noise
in the earnings signals.

As suggested by Jeter and Chaney

(1992, 841), intuitively, these relationships are expected
because information from earnings announcements could
resolve more uncertainty for firms with greater
uncertainty, and the stock market participants will rely
less on earnings signals if the signals are perceived to
be noisier and thus less dependable.

Deregulation leads

to a higher level of uncertainty, but deregulation is not
expected to lead to noisier earnings signals.
larger ERCs are expected after deregulation.

Therefore,
In addition,

Teets (1992) finds that the ERCs of electric utilities are
significantly less than those of nonregulated firms.

This

result suggests that ERCs of regulated firms are smaller
than those of nonregulated firms and that ERCs should thus
be larger after deregulation.
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On the other hand, deregulation substantially reduces
industry barriers to entry, and Biddle and Seow (1991)
provide evidence that ERCs are positively correlated with
these same barriers.

Moreover, results of prior research

suggest that the risk of firms experiencing deregulation
could increase.
(1990)

Collins and Kothari (1989) and Lipe

find that ERCs vary negatively with the systematic

risk of the firms (though, Easton and Zmijewski 1989,
among others find the relationship to be insignificant).
These results suggest that ERCs could decline after
deregulation.

However, the results in Teets (1992)

suggest that these two factors (barriers to entry and firm
risk) are not dominant factors.

Teets finds that the ERCs

of electric utilities are significantly less than those of
nonregulated firms but one would probably expect that the
barriers to entry are higher in the electric utility
industry than those in nonregulated industries.

Moreover,

Teets finds that electric utilities have lower systematic
risk than nonregulated firms, but the ERCs of electric
utilities are significantly less than those of
nonregulated firms.

Therefore, it is expected that the

uncertainty factor will dominate, and that larger ERCs are
expected after deregulation.

These arguments lead to the

following hypothesis (stated in alternative form):
H[ :

Earnings response coefficients are larger after
deregulation than before deregulation.
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Hypothesis Two
Lang (1991) suggests that the magnitude of the stock
price responses to earnings is a function of the degree of
uncertainty about the time series parameters of earnings.
He presents a model in which future earnings are estimated
by investors from the observed time series of earnings.
The implication of his model is that when investors are
less certain about the time series parameters of earnings,
ERCs will be relatively larger.

Over time, as the

uncertainty is resolved, ERCs will decrease toward a
positive lower bound.

Lang (1991) provides empirical

evidence that ERCs decrease over time, following the date
firms begin trading publicly.
Deregulation subjects firms to a relatively new
operating environment.

Earnings numbers before

deregulation will not necessarily reflect what can be
expected following deregulation.

Thus, after

deregulation, as in the case of initial public offerings,
uncertainty about the future prospects for the firm will
be relatively high.

As a longer series of earnings

numbers after deregulation becomes available, uncertainty
decreases and the magnitude of the stock price responses
to earnings decreases.
Rao (1989) also examines the intertemporal variation
of ERCs following initial public offerings, but she uses
annual earnings announcements and investigates annual ERCs
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(i.e., slope coefficients from regressions of annual stock
returns on annual unexpected earnings).
differ from those of Lang (1991).

Rao's results

Specifically, Rao finds

that as firms' stocks are seasoned, the annual ERCs
increase.

Rao's basic premise is that the quality of the

earnings signals improve over time following initial
public offerings.

However, these results are not expected

in this study for three reasons.

First, this study

considers quarterly earnings announcements (as does Lang),
and as suggested by Lang (1991, 230), perhaps the pattern
of decreasing ERCs is most pronounced over the first
several quarters following events that substantially
increase the uncertainty level.

Thus, it will be

difficult to detect this pattern using annual earnings
announcements.

Second, this study examines stock market

responses to earnings announcements over only a two-day
period, whereas Rao examines stock market responses over a
12-month period.

Third, as suggested previously,

deregulation is not expected to change the quality of the
earnings signals.

As a result, it is expected that the

uncertainty factor will dominate, and that the magnitude
of the stock price responses to earnings will decrease
over time following deregulation.

This leads to the

following hypothesis (stated in alternative form):
H,:

Following deregulation, earnings response
coefficients decrease over time.
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Hypothesis Three
This study examines deregulation in three industries:
airline, natural gas, and trucking.

The scope and extent

of deregulation vary for these three industries.

The

Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 essentially eliminated
all economic regulations on airlines.

The Act ended the

CAB'S authority over routes on December 31, 1981, and its
authority over airfares on January 1, 1983.

The Motor

Carrier Act of 1980 substantially relaxed entry and rate
regulations in the trucking industry.

However, the Act

fell short of the kind of deregulation prescribed in the
Airline Deregulation Act of 1978.

Specifically, the Motor

Carrier Act of 1980 did not eliminate entry and rate
regulations; it just substantially relaxed them.

Finally,

the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 only partially
deregulated the price of natural gas charged by producers.
The increase in the uncertainty about a firm's future
cash flows due to deregulation should depend on the scope
and extent of deregulation.

Intuitively, the full-scale

deregulation in the airline industry should lead to a
larger increase in uncertainty than the substantial
relaxation of regulations in the trucking industry.

The

latter, in turn, should lead to a larger increase in
uncertainty than the gradual and partial deregulation in
the natural gas industry.

However, factors other than the

scope and extent of deregulation can also affect the
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magnitude of the increases in the uncertainty induced by
deregulation.

One such factor is the ability of

deregulated firms to cope with the changes in their
operating environment.

For example, in the natural gas

industry long term contracts between producers and
pipelines are quite common.

Bound by contracts signed in

the pre-deregulation era, these producers and pipelines
cannot respond quickly to changes in the operating
environment induced by deregulation.

Furthermore,

relatively limited mobility of the operating assets of
these firms can also hinder the adjustments to the new
operating environment.

On the other hand, airlines can

adjust the prices they charge and the routes they serve
relatively easily.

Therefore, it is unclear what the

order of the magnitude of the increases in uncertainty and
thus the order of the magnitude of the increase in ERCs
is.

This issue is examined empirically by testing the

following hypothesis (stated in alternative form):
H):

The increases in the earnings response
coefficients due to deregulation of firms in the
airline, natural gas, and trucking industries
are not the same.
Sample Selection

This study attempts to determine the impact of
deregulation on ERCs.

Three industries (airline, natural

gas, and trucking) that were deregulated in the late 1970s
and early 1980s are examined.

The laws that deregulated
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these industries are the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978,
the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, and the Motor Carrier
Act of 1980.

As the Natural Gas Policy Act deregulated

only the prices at which producers could sell natural gas
to pipelines at wellheads, only firms engaged in the
exploration, production or transmission of natural gas are
examined in this study.

In other words, firms engaged

primarily in petroleum exploration and production or in
natural gas distribution are excluded from this study.
Firms included in the study must meet the following
criteria:

(1 ) the firm must be in the airline, natural gas

exploration, production or transmission, or trucking
industries;

(2) the firm must be followed by the Value

Line Investment Survey (Value Line) and must have Value
Line's actual and forecast quarterly earnings per share;
(3) earnings announcement dates of the firm must be
available from the Wall Street Journal Index or the
Standard and Poor's Compustat;

(4) the firm must have

daily return data on the Center for Research in Security
Prices (CRSP) daily return tapes;

(5) the firm must have

at least 32 usable observations over the study's testing
periods^; and (6 ) the firm must not have its earnings
announcement dates and the immediately preceding trading
dates coincide with the dates of deregulation.

This last

^The testing periods used in the study are discussed
in detail later in the chapter.
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criterion is included to ensure that earnings
announcements can be classified as those in pre- or post
deregulation periods.
Value Line, Standard and Poor's Register of
Corporations, Directors and Executives, and Moody's
Industrial Manual are consulted to determine a firm's
membership in a certain industry.

Earnings announcement

dates are taken primarily from the Wall Street Journal
Index.

For those which are not available from the Wall

Street Journal Index, Compustat are used.

Return data are

taken from the CRSP daily return tapes.
Value Line's most recent forecasts of quarterly
earnings per share are used as a proxy for the market's
earnings expectation.

Earnings forecasts are adjusted for

any stock splits and stock dividends that occurred between
the earnings forecast dates and the earnings announcement
dates.

The choice of Value Line analysts' forecasts as

the proxy for the market's expectation of earnings is
supported by the evidence reported by Leftwich and
Zmijewski (1994) and Philbrick and Ricks (1991).

Leftwich

and Zmijewski find that Value Line forecast errors are
more highly correlated with the 3-day abnormal returns
around earnings announcements than are the seasonal random
walk forecast errors and the random walk forecast errors.
Meanwhile, Philbrick and Ricks compare the associations of
seven forecast error metrics (using combinations of Value
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Line and Institutional Brokers Estimate System (IBES)
forecasts and Value Line. IBES, and Compustat actual
earnings) with the 3-day abnormal returns around earnings
announcements.

They find that the strongest associations

are obtained with the use of Value Line actual earnings
and either Value Line or IBES forecast data.
Statistical Procedures
Regression Model
The following regression model (denoted as the full
model) is estimated for firms in the sample to test the
hypothesized effects of deregulation on ERCs:
CARjq = ao+a,D,„+a2ÜE,-,+a3ÜEi,*Di,+a4UEi,*Di„* (1/T,,) +a;RVL;q+agUE;q*PERjq
+a7ÜEi,*INT;,+agUEi,*BETAi,+Ui,

(5 )

where
CARjq =
Djq

=
=

UEjq

=

Tjq

=
=

RVLjq =

PERjq

=

cumulative abnormal returns over day 0 and day
- 1
relative to the earnings announcement date of
firm i in quarter q.
1
if quarter q is in the post-deregulation
period.
0
if quarter q is in the pre-deregulation
period.
(Value Line 's actual earnings per share minus
Value Line's most recent earnings per share
forecast) divided by share price two days before
earnings announcement date of firm i in quarter
q1
if quarter q is in the pre-deregulation
period.
the number of quarters since deregulation for
quarters in the post-deregulation period.
cumulative abnormal return from the most recent
Value Line's earnings forecast date through 2
days prior to the earnings announcement date of
firm i in quarter q.
earnings persistence for firm i in quarter q,
measured as the time-series parameter in the
Foster (1977) model.
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BETAjq=

beta estimated from the market model for firm i
in quarter q.
yield of long term U,S, Government bonds in the
month of the earnings announcement of firm i in
quarter q.
random disturbance term.

INT^ =
Ujq

=

CARjq is computed as:
(6 )
j— 1
where R,^ is the actual daily return of firm i on day j and
ERjqj is the expected return of firm i on day j.

Expected

returns are estimated using the market model:
= Gi +

+ ©it

(7)

where
Rji

=
=

Oji

=

return of firm i on day t;
return of the CRSP equally-weighted market
portfolio on day t;
random disturbance term.

The market model is estimated using a 200-day trading
period prior to the day before each quarterly earnings
announcement, excluding the day prior to and the day of
any quarterly earnings announcements of the firm.

ER^ is

then calculated as û!i+/3i*R„j where C; and j8 ; are parameters
estimated from the above regression, and R^j is the actual
return of the CRSP equally-weighted market portfolio on
day j .

A second method of estimating expected returns is

also used.

In this method, the expected return is the

equally-weighted return on the market value portfolio of
which the firm is a member.

Market value portfolios are

constructed by the CRSP every year according to the firm's
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market capitalization at previous year-end.

There are ten

portfolios each containing a p p r o x i m a t e l y the same number
of firms.

This second method is intended to control for

the widely documented firm size effect (Kothari and Wasley
1989) .

Since the tenor of the results of the study is not

sensitive to the estimation method of expected returns,
only results using the market model method are reported.
Unexpected earnings (UE^), defined as Value Line's
actual earnings minus Value Line's most recent earnings
forecasts, are deflated by stock price.

The theoretical

models of Choi (1985), Holthausen and Verrecchia (1988),
and Lev (1989) suggest that unexpected earnings should be
deflated by stock price.

Furthermore, Christie (1987)

also argues that stock price is the correct deflator if
the dependent variable is stock return.
The term l/T,, is included in the regression to model
for the hypothesized pattern of ERCs (i.e., decreasing
over time) after deregulation.
also used by Lang (1991).

This functional form is

An alternative way, discussed

later in the chapter, of modelling the hypothesized
intertemporal variation of ERCs following deregulation is
also used.
Value Line's earnings forecasts are used as a proxy
for the market's expectation of earnings immediately
before earnings announcements.

However, Value Line's

earnings forecasts are made before actual announcement
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dates."*

In order to mitigate the measurement error in

expected earnings arising from stale forecasts, RVLj, is
included in the regression model (see Easton and Zmijewski
1989 for the rationale in including this variable).
A number of variables, which have been documented to
be determinants of ERCs, are included in the regression
model to control for the effects of these variables.*
Collins and Kothari (1989), Easton and Zmijewski (1989),
among others have documented that ERCs are positively
related to earnings persistence.

In this study, earnings

persistence (PER,,) is measured as the time-series
parameter in the Foster (1977) model.

For each firm-

guarter in the sample, earnings persistence is estimated
using the six most recent actual quarterly earnings and
all the available Value Line's quarterly earnings
forecasts.

Collins and Kothari (1989) find a negative

correlation between the ERC and the risk-free interest
rate.

As in Collins and Kothari (1989), the yields of

long term U.S. Government bonds are used as a proxy for
the risk-free interest rate (INT^).

The evidence of the

■*Over the periods investigated in this study. Value
Line's earnings forecasts were made, on average, 18
trading days prior to the earnings announcement dates for
the sample firms.
^Regression models with an additional control
variable, financial leverage, which is defined as long
term debt divided by market value of equity, are also
employed.
The results are qualitatively similar to those
estimated without this variable.
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effects of beta on ERCs is mixed.
(1989)

Collins and Kothari

and Lipe (1990) find evidence of a significant

negative association between ERCs and beta.

However,

Easton and Zmijewski (1989) and Ahmed (1994) do not find
the negative correlation to be consistently significant.
Beta (BETAjq) is the parameter estimate of the slope
coefficient in the market model (see equation 7).
All control variables (i.e., earnings persistence,
interest rate, and beta) enter the model interactively
with unexpected earnings so that the coefficients (a*, a?,
ag) represent the average change in ERCs per unit change in
these variables.®

Multicollinearity is a potential data

problem since interaction terms are included in the
regression models.

To mitigate the multicollinearity

problem, the following alternative model specification
(denoted as the mean adjusted model) is also used’’*:
CAR;, = ao+a,D,.,+a2UE,,+a3UE,„*Di,+a4UE,-,*Di,*(l/Ti,)+a5RVLi,
+a«UE;q* (PERj,-MPERi) +a7ÜE,„* (IN T ,,-M IN T i)
+agUEiq* ( BETAi,-MBETAi) +0,-^

(8)

®This approach is consistent with Freeman and Tse
(1992, 203), Teoh and Wong (1993, 355), and Bandyopadhyay
(1994, 667).
’it can be noted from the results presented in next
chapter that this model specification greatly mitigates
the multicollinearity problem.
*First differencing instead of mean adjusting of the
control variables is also employed. The results are
qualitatively similar to those of the mean adjusted
models.
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where MPER^, MINT;, and MBETA; are the means of earnings
persistence, interest rate, and beta respectively of firm
i over the sample period.

Definitions of all other terms

in this model are the same as those in equation (5).

In

this model specification the coefficients a^, a?, and a,
represent the average change in ERCs per unit deviation
from the firm-specific means of these control variables.
Furthermore, in order to determine the effects of these
control variables on the findings of the study, regression
models without these control variables are also employed.
In other words, the following regression model (denoted as
the reduced model) is also estimated for firms in the
sample:
CARiq = ao+a,Di,+a2UE,-q+a3ÜEi,*Di,+a4UEi,*Di,* (l/T,,) +a5RVLi,+U,.,

(9 )

Definitions of all the terms in this model are the same as
those in equation (5).
In addition to using a reciprocal function to model
the intertemporal variation of ERCs after deregulation, a
dummy variable (Ej^) with a value of one for the first ten
quarters in the post-deregulation period and a value of
zero otherwise is also employed.

Therefore, the following

regression and its corresponding mean adjusted and reduced
models are also estimated:
CARjq = ao+aiDi,+a2UEiq+a3UEiq*Diq+a4UE;,*Diq*Eiq+ajRVLi,+a6UEiq*PERiq
fa^U Ej/IN Tiq+agU E i/B etaiq+U iq
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Definitions of all terms except E;, in this model are the
same as those in equation (5).

This model specification

represents a more general test for the evidence of
decreasing ERCs over time without the restriction of a
reciprocal functional form.
In the regression models represented by equations
(5),

(7), or (8 ), the ERC before deregulation (0^=0) is a^

and the ERC after deregulation (D,,,=l) is a2 +&3+&4 (l/Tk,)
after controlling for the covariates.

For the alternative

specification models where E^ is used, the ERC after
deregulation is az+a^+a^ for the first ten quarters and is
a,+a3 for the next ten quarters after controlling for the
covariates.

Positive values of a^+a^ are consistent under

both model specifications with the prediction that ERCs
after deregulation are greater than ERCs before
deregulation.

Positive values of a^ are consistent with

the prediction that ERCs decline over time following
deregulation, after controlling for the covariates.
The research hypotheses in this study are tested
using both pooled time-series cross-sectional regressions
and firm-specific time-series regressions.

When pooled

time-series cross-sectional regressions are used,
hypothesis one is tested by determining whether the
parameter estimate of a^+a^ is significantly positive.
Hypothesis two is tested by determining whether the
parameter estimate of a< is significantly positive.
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Finally, hypothesis three is tested by comparing the
parameter estimate of a^+a,. in one industry with that in
another industry.
When firm-specific time-series regressions are
estimated separately for each firm in the sample, the
significance of the parameter estimates of a^+a^'s and a*'s
is tested on an aggregate basis by using the following
z-statistic:
ti

where
tj

=

kj
n

=
=

the t-statistic for firm i associated with the
estimate of the parameter
the degree of freedom in firm i's regression
the number of firms in the sample.

Under the Central Limit Theorem and under the null
hypothesis that the parameter equals zero, the
distribution of the z-statistic is standard normal (see
Christie 1990 for a detailed discussion of the test).

In

using this test, it is assumed that the parameter
estimates are independent across the firms in the sample.
To investigate cross-sectional dependence, pairwise
correlations of the residuals from the firm-specific
regressions are estimated since cross-sectional
correlation of the residuals across equations is a
necessary condition for cross-sectional correlation of the
parameter estimates (Theil 1971).

The mean correlation
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coefficients are positive and at most 0.05 for all the
samples and model specifications investigated in this
study.

Thus, no strong evidence of cross-sectional

dependence is found.
Hypothesis one is tested by determining whether the
z-statistic calculated by aggregating the parameter
estimates of a^+a^ is significantly positive.

Similarly,

hypothesis two is tested by determining whether the
corresponding z-statistic calculated for a^ is
significantly positive.

Finally, hypothesis three is

tested by comparing the z-statistic of the parameter
estimates of a^+a^ of one industry with the corresponding
z-statistic of another industry.
Estimation Period
When available, 40 time series observations (20
observations each for the pre- and post-deregulation
periods) are used in the analysis.

To be retained in the

sample, firms must have at least 32 usable observations.
The decision to use this number of observations in the
time series is arbitrary.

This choice of the length of

the time series represents a compromise.

On one hand, the

time series has to be long enough to permit a reliable
test of the research hypotheses.

On the other hand, as

the time series becomes longer, the assumption of
intertemporal stability of the parameters becomes less
reasonable.
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As mentioned previously, the Airline Deregulation Act
of 1978, the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, and the Motor
Carrier Act of 1980 are the laws which deregulated these
industries.

However, the date the stock market

incorporated the effects of deregulation may not be the
date the acts were signed into law or the date the acts
became effective.

Furthermore, there could be a period of

transition to deregulation.

A transition period is a

period over which the industry is not in the pre
deregulation era nor in the post-deregulation era.

The

determinations of deregulation dates and transition
periods are done subjectively after reviewing legislative
history and prior studies of deregulation in these three
industries.
The airline industry was deregulated when the
Airlines Deregulation Act was passed on October 24, 1978.
However, the CAB had already started toward a more
flexible regulatory regime before the passage of the Act.
Debate on regulatory reform stemmed from the poor profit
performance of airlines coupled with substantial fare
increases in the early 1970s.

Questions about the CAB's

regulatory policies were growing.

In July 1975, a special

CAB task-force report recommended legislative reform.
Meanwhile, a report by the Senate Aviation Committee
concluded that increased competition was warranted.
Thereafter, the CAB began to adopt a more liberal
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regulatory policies.

The first significant step to

deregulation was the approval of the advance booking
charters on October 7, 1976 (Kaplan 1986, 44).

Unlike

earlier charters, which usually required membership in
specific clubs or other restrictions, the advance booking
charters required only advance-purchase and minimum-stay
requirements.

Recognizing the increased threat of

competition from charters, scheduled carriers such as
American Airlines applied for authority to offer
substantial discount fares.

The CAB routinely approved

these requests of discount fares (Kaplan 1986, 44).

At

the same time, the CAB also took steps to give airlines
greater discretion to determine the routes they served
(Kaplan 1986, 45).

These more liberal regulatory policies

were eventually ratified by the passage of the Airline
Deregulation Act in October 1978.

The Act instructed the

CAB to place reliance on competition in the regulation of
airlines and ended the CAB's authority over routes on
December 31, 1981, and the CAB's authority over fares on
January 1, 1983.

However, for the most part, the CAB's

regulation on fares and routes ended sooner than mandated
by the Act (Kaplan 1986, 47).

To increase the pricing

flexibility, the CAB, on May 14, 1980, allowed airlines to
raise their fares ranging from 30% up to an unlimited
amount, depending on the length of the routes involved.
This essentially ended the CAB's regulation on airfares
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(Kaplan 1986, 47).
sooner.

The end to route regulation came even

Under the provisions of the Airline Deregulation

Act, airlines could enter one market each year without
formal CAB approval.

In addition, the burden of proof in

route cases were shifted from the potential entrant to the
incumbent.

In summary, the first significant step to

airline deregulation was taken on October 7, 1976 and the
CAB's regulation on airfares and routes essentially ended
on May 14, 1980.

Therefore, the period before October 7,

1976 is considered as the regulated period while the
period after May 14, 1980 is considered as the deregulated
period.

The period in between these two dates is

considered as the transition period.
The Motor Carrier Act of 1980 was passed on July 1,
1980.

While some loosening of trucking regulation can be

traced back to 1975, major regulatory reform began in 1977
after Daniel O'Neal was appointed as the Chairman of the
ICC (Kahn 1979, 5).

A major step toward deregulation was

taken when the ICC revised the procedures for applying for
motor carrier operating authority on December 9, 1977
(Kahn 1979, 7).

The revised procedures made it much

easier to obtain the necessary authority to engage in
motor carrier operations.

Thereafter, the ICC continued

to loosen its controls on the operations of trucking
firms.

By 1979 the ICC had almost totally deregulated the

industry by substantially reinterpreting the law in the
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direction of reduced regulation (Moore 1986, 21). The
Motor Carrier Act of 1980 basically ratified the liberal
regulatory policies of the ICC and provided an explicit
direction for the deregulation efforts in the trucking
industry (Harper 1980, 7).

The ICC began implementing the

law immediately after the Act was signed (Moore 1986, 21).
Therefore, the period before December 9, 1977 is
considered as the regulated period while the period after
July 1, 1980 is considered as the deregulated period.

The

period in between these two dates is considered as the
transition period.
The Natural Gas Policy Act was passed into law on
November 10, 1978.

Unlike the cases of airline and

trucking deregulation, there was no loosening up of
regulation in the natural gas industry before the passage
of the deregulation law.

Although the law was debated for

over a year, the passage of the law was never assured
until very close to the time that it was finally passed.
Thus, the period before November 10, 1978 is considered as
the regulated period.

Under the provisions of the Natural

Gas Policy Act, the prices of the majority of the gas
deregulated by the Act became decontrolled on January 1,
1985.

In the interim, the price ceilings were indexed to

inflation.

Therefore, the period after January 1, 1985 is

considered as the deregulated period, and the period
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between November 10, 1978 and January 1, 1985 is
considered as the transition period.
Summary
Chapter three discusses the research methods used to
answer the research question: How does deregulation affect
ERGS?

Three research hypotheses are developed:

(1) ERCs

are larger after deregulation than before deregulation;
(2)

ERCs decline over time following deregulation; and (3)

the increases in ERCs due to deregulation of firms in the
three industries examined are not the same.

Sample firms

are obtained from the Value Line Investment Survey.
Regression models are then developed to test the research
hypotheses.

Both pooled time-series cross-sectional and

firm-specific time-series regression models are used.
Variables found to be determinants of ERCs in previous
research are included in some of the regression models to
control for the effects of these variables on ERCs.
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CHAPTER FOUR
RESULTS

This chapter reports the analyses and results of the
study.

The first section presents the sample selection.

The second section reports the results of the tests of
research hypotheses.
Sample Selection
As indicated in chapter three, firms included in this
study must meet the following criteria:

(1 ) the firm must

be in the airline, natural gas exploration, production or
transmission, or trucking industries;

(2 ) the firm must be

followed by the Value Line and must have Value Line's
actual and forecast quarterly earnings per share;

(3)

earnings announcement dates of the firm must be available
from the Wall Street Journal Index or the Standard and
Poor's Compustat;

(4) the firm must have daily return data

on the CRSP daily return tapes;

(5) the firm must have at

least 32 usable observations over the study's testing
periods; and (6 ) the firm must not have its earnings
announcement dates and the immediately preceding trading
dates coincide with the dates of deregulation.
Application of these selection criteria resulted in a
sample of 35 firms listed in table 1.

Nine of the sample

50
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Table 1
List of Sample Firms
Company Name
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6 .
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

American
Delta
Eastern
Northwest
Pan Am
PSA
TWA
United
Western
Apache
Arkla
Coastal
Columbia Gas
Consolidated Nat. Gas
Enron
Equitable Resource
Helmerich & Payne
Kerr-McGee
KN Energy
Louisiana Land & Expl.
Mesa
Panhandle Eastern
Tenneco
Texas Eastern
Transco Energy
Arkansas Best
CLC of America
Consolidated Freight
Flexi-Van
Leaseway Transp.
Overnite Transp.
Ryder Systems
Transway International
Xtra
Yellow Freight

eusIP number
001765
247361
276191
62945J
697757
693624
893349
902549
957586
037411
041237
190441
197648
209615
293561
294549
423452
492386
482620
546268
590655
698462
880370
882387
893532
040789
125615
209237
339376
522066
690326
783549
894015
984138
985509

Industry
Airlines
Airlines
Airlines
Airlines
Airlines
Airlines
Airlines
Airlines
Airlines
Natural Gas
Natural Gas
Natural Gas
Natural Gas
Natural Gas
Natural Gas
Natural Gas
Natural Gas
Natural Gas
Natural Gas
Natural Gas
Natural Gas
Natural Gas
Natural Gas
Natural Gas
Natural Gas
Trucking
Trucking
Trucking
Trucking
Trucking
Trucking
Trucking
Trucking
Trucking
Trucking
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firms are airlines, sixteen are natural gas firms, and the
remaining ten are trucking firms.
Table 2 reports the pre- and post-deregulation sample
means of the variables used in the regression models for
the full sample and samples disaggregated by industry.

It

can be noted that no significant differences emerged
between the pre- and post-deregulation periods in abnormal
returns around earnings announcement dates or abnormal
returns from earnings forecast dates through two days
prior to the earnings announcement dates for any of the
samples.

Unexpected earnings are negative for both the

full sample and samples disaggregated by industry in both
pre- and post-deregulation periods.*

This is consistent

with extant empirical evidence (e.g., Lys and Sohn 1990;
O'Brien 1988) that financial analysts in general are, on
average, optimistic in their earnings forecasts.

For

natural gas firms unexpected earnings become significantly
more negative in the post-deregulation period.

However,

this is due to the fact that the magnitude of unexpected
earnings are relatively very small prior to deregulation
for these firms.

In spite of the evidence of optimism.

Value Line analysts' forecasts are used as the proxy for
the market's earnings expectation because of the strong

^Recalled that unexpected earnings are defined as
actual earnings minus forecast earnings scaled by stock
price.
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Table 2
Samüle Means of Variables Used in the Regressions
Prederegulation
mean

Post
deregulation
mean

T«

Abnormal returns around earnings announcements
0.00146
-0.00184
Full sample
-0.00407
Airline
0.00028
—0.00450
Natural gas
-0.00018
0.00428
Trucking
0.00549
Unexpected earnings
Full sample
Airline
Natural gas
Trucking

1.47
0.79
1.66

0.26

-0.00342
-0. 00712
-0.00054
-0.00479

-0.00411
-0.00596
-0.00315
■0.00401

0.27
-0.13
2 .7 4 b
-0.18

-0.00264
0.00857
-0.00829
•0.00383

0.00128
0.00864
0.00146
-0.00539

-0.89
0.01
-1.60
0.18

Earnings persistence
Full sample
Airline
Natural gas
Trucking

0.16937
0.26038
0.11663
0.17180

0.17461
0.14546
0.17489
0.19953

0.20
.5 9 b
-1.50
—0.54

Interest rate
Full sample
Airline
Natural gas
Trucking

0.07818
0.07345
0.08090
0.07811

0.10851
0.12334
0.09098
0.12331

-38.60b
-46.40b
-15.0 3 b
-5 4 .7 3 b

1.27581
1.69516
0.99262
1.35744

1.10350
1.50013
0.96424
0.97846

.1 3 b
.6 5 b
0.80
6.70b

RVL=
Full sample
Airline
Natural gas
Trucking

-

-

2

Beta
Full sample
Airline
Natural gas
Trucking

6

5

'T-statistic for testing equality of means between the preand post-deregulation periods,
bgignificant at p < 0.05.
'Cumulative abnormal return from the earnings forecast date
through two days prior to the earnings announcement date.
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association between stock market responses to earnings and
forecast errors based on Value Line analysts' forecasts
reported in Leftwich and Zmijewski (1994) and Philbrick
and Ricks (1991).

Furthermore, the accuracy

characteristics of Value Line analysts' forecasts are
similar to those of other databases such as IBES and the
Standard Poor's Earnings Forecaster (Philbrick and Ricks
1991)
Earnings persistence declined significantly from the
pre-deregulation to the post-deregulation period for
airlines, but not for natural gas or trucking firms.
Interest rates increased significantly from the pre
deregulation to the post-deregulation period for all
sample firms.

This reflects that interest rates in the

1980s were generally higher than those in the 1970s.

A

number of studies (e.g., Bundt et al. 1992; Chen and
Sanger 1985) find that deregulation increases the beta
values of deregulated firms.

However, in this study

sample firms in airline and trucking industries
experienced a significant reduction in beta from the pre
deregulation to the post-deregulation period, while
natural gas firms did not experience a significant change
in beta.

One possible reason for the differences in the

findings of this study from those of the two
aforementioned studies is that there is a transition
period between pre- and post-deregulation periods in this
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study.

Furthermore, the findings in this study are

consistent with those in Cunningham et al. (1988) who find
that beta increased for the period immediately after the
passage of the Airline Deregulation Act in 1978, but beta
fell to a level below or about equal to that in the
regulated period two years after the Act was passed.
Results of the Tests of Hypotheses
This section presents the results of the analyses of
the research hypotheses.

Both pooled time-series cross-

sectional and firm-specific time-series regressions are
employed.
Hypothesis one examines the changes in the magnitude
of ERCs due to deregulation while hypothesis two examines
the intertemporal variation of ERCs following
deregulation.

Table 3 presents the results of the

analysis for the full sample.

It can be noted from panel

A of table 3 that the maximum condition index is 31 for
the full model pooled regression.

Belsley et al.

(1980)

suggest that condition indexes in excess of 30 indicate
multicollinearity problems.

On the other hand, the

maximum condition indexes of the mean adjusted and reduced
model pooled regressions are eleven and four respectively.

‘“The null hypothesis that the residuals are
homoskedastic is tested using the procedure developed by
White (1980).
The null is reject only when pooled
regressions are estimated for the natural gas sample.
In
these cases t-statistics are calculated using White's
(1980) heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix.
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Table 3
Results of various pooled and firm-specific regressions
for the full sample. (A reciprocal function is used to
model the intertemporal variation of ERCs following
deregulation.)
Panel A: Pooled
a3+a/
Fuir

a/

-0.148
(0.351)

-0.073
(0.626)

Mean adjusted** -0.281
(0.103)

-0.097
(0.522)

Reduced'

-0.074
(0.611)

-0.235
(0.061)

Panel B: Firm-specific
a3+a4*’

a4"

Maximum
condition index
31

11

4
Number of
regressions
with condition
indexes > 30

Full'

0.608
(0.543)

1.859
(0.063)

35

Mean adjusted**

0.608
(0.543)

1.859
(0.063)

7

Reduced'

-0.076
(0.947)

1.047
(0.297)

0

“Parameter estimates (p-values in parentheses).
'’Z-statistics (p-values in parentheses) .
'Full model : CAR;, = ao+a,Diq+a2UE;q+a3ÜEiq*Di,+a4UEi,*Diq* (l/T;,)
+a5RVL;q+agUE;/PERiq+a7 UE;/INT;,+agUE;q*BETA;q+U;q.
‘‘Mean adjusted model : CAR,q = ag+a^Diq+a2UE;q+a3UE;q*0;^
+a4UEi/D;q* ( 1 /T ,„) +ajRVLi,+a6UEi,* (PER,,-MPERi) +a7UE;,* (IN T ^ -M IN T ;)
+agUE,,* (BETAjq-MBETAi) +U,,.

^Reduced model : CARj, = ao+a,Di,+a2ÜEiq+a3UEiq*Dj,+a4 UEi,*Diq* (l/T;,)
+a;RVLjq+Ujq .
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well below the threshold of 30.

Results in panel A of

table 3 indicate that for the full sample the change in
ERCs due to deregulation (a^+a^) is not significantly
different from zero for any of the three pooled regression
model specifications.

The coefficient to test the

intertemporal variation of ERCs following deregulation (a^)
is also not significantly different from zero for any of
the three pooled regression model specifications.
Panel B of table 3 presents the results of firmspecific regressions.

Full, mean adjusted, and reduced

model regressions are estimated for each sample firm.

The

maximum condition indexes are in excess of 30 for all 35
firm-specific regressions for the full model while they
are in excess of 30 for only seven firm-specific
regressions for the mean adjusted model, and none is in
excess of 30

for

the reduced model.

The

t-statisticsof

parameter estimates for each sample firm are then
aggregated to form a z-statistic according to equation
(11) described in chapter three.

It can be noted that the

z-statistics calculated from the full model firm-specific
regressions are the same as those calculated from the mean
adjusted model firm-specific regressions.

This can be

explained by

the

way the mean adjusted model

is

structured.

The

only difference between

fullandthe

the

mean adjusted models is the way the control variables are
included in the regressions.

For the full model control
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variables enter the regression as the raw data interacted
with the unexpected earnings.

For the mean adjusted model

control variables enter the regression as the deviations
from their respective firm-specific means interacted with
the unexpected earnings.

Since these firm-specific means

are constant across observations when firm-specific
regressions are estimated, parameter estimates and their
standard errors from the full and the mean adjusted models
are the same except for a;, the coefficient of the
unexpected earnings variable.

Therefore, the z-statistics

aggregated for a^+a^ and a^ from these two models are the
same.

However, since these firm-specific means are not

constant across observations when pooled regressions are
estimated, parameter estimates from the full and the mean
adjusted model pooled regressions are not the same.
Results in panel B of table 3 indicate that the
change in ERCs due to deregulation (a^+a^) and the
coefficient to test the intertemporal variation of ERCs
following deregulation (a^) are again not significantly
different from zero for any of the three model
specifications.

In summary, for the full sample both the

change in ERCs due to deregulation and the intertemporal
variation of ERCs following deregulation are found to be
insignificant.
Table 4 presents the results of pooled regressions
for samples disaggregated by industry.

It can be noted
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Table 4
Results of various pooled regressions for samples
disaggregated by industry. (A reciprocal function is used
to model the intertemporal variation of ERCs following
deregulation.)
Panel A: Airline
a,+a4'
Full*’
Mean adjusted'
Reduced**

&4'

Maximum
condition

-0.439
(0.104)
-0.524
(0.057)
-0.363
(0.073)

-0.290
(0.233)
-0.344
(0.163)
-0.140
(0.531)

33

-0.366
(0.530)'
-0.443
(0.470)'
-1.153
(0.007)'

-0.070
(0.918)'
0.028
(0.969)'
-0.718
(0.259)'

41

-0.492
(0.288)
-0.682
(0.151)
0.064
(0.789)

0.073
(0.842)
0.041
(0.897)
0.077
(0.797)

51

12

6

Panel B: Natural gas
Full”
Mean adjusted'
Reduced**

7
5

Panel C : Trucking
Full”
Mean adjusted'
Reduced**

13
3

“Parameter estimates (p-values in parentheses).
Tull model : CAR;, = ao+aiDi,+a2UEj,+a3UEi,*Di,+a4UEi,*D,,,* (l/Tj,)
+a5RVLi,+a6ÜEi,*PERi,+a7UE,-,*INTi,+agUE;,*BETAi,+Ui,.
'Mean adjusted model : CARj, = ao+a,Diq+a2UE;q+a3UEiq*Diq
fa^UEiq^D;/ ( 1/T,q) +a5RVL,,+a6UE,„* (PERjq-MPERi) +a7UEj,* ( IN T j^ -M IN T i)
+agUE,„* (BETAj,-MBETAi) +U..,.

^Reduced model ; CAR^q = ao+a,Diq+a2UEiq+a3UEiq*D;q+a4UEiq*D,q* (l/Tjq)
+a;RVL;q+U;q .
'These p-values are determined using White's (1980)
heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix since the
null hypothesis that the errors are homoskedastic is
rejected at the 0.05 level (the chi-square statistics are
61.3, 57.5, and 24.8 for the full, the mean adjusted, and
the reduced models respectively).
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that the maximum condition indexes are in excess of 30 for
all three industry ssumples for the full model pooled
regressions while they are not in excess of 30 for either
the mean adjusted or the reduced model.

The change in

ERCs due to deregulation (a^+a^) is not significantly
different from zero for any of the three model
specifications for any of the three industries except for
the reduced model of the natural gas industry.

When the

reduced model is estimated for firms in the natural gas
industry, a^+a^ is significantly negative which means that,
contrary to expectations, ERCs are smaller after
deregulation for natural gas firms.

However, a^+a^ is not

significantly different from zero for either the full or
the mean adjusted model.

In other words, the significant

reduction in the magnitude of ERCs is not found when
control variables are included in the models.

As to a^, it

is again not significantly different from zero for any of
the three model specifications for any of the three
industries.
Table 5 presents the results of firm-specific
regressions for samples disaggregated by industry.
Neither the change in ERCs due to deregulation (a^+a^) nor
the coefficient to test the intertemporal variation of
ERCs following deregulation (a^) is significantly different
from zero for any of the three model specifications for
any of the three industries.

In summary, after
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Table 5
Results of various firm-specific regressions for samples
disaggregated by industry. (A reciprocal function is used
to model the intertemporal variation of ERCs following
deregulation.)

Panel A: Airlines
Full"
Mean adjusted'
Reduced**

Number of
regressions
with condition
indexes > 3 0

aj+a/
0.237
(0.813)
0.237
(0.813)
-0.636
(0.525)

0.540
(0.589)
0.540
(0.589)
-0.232
(0.816)

0.619
(0.541)
0.619
(0.541)
0.052
(0.959)

1.412
(0.158)
1.412
(0.158)
1.169
(0.242)

16

0.130
(0.897)
0.130
(0.897)
0.396
(0.692)

1.180
(0.238)
1.180
(0.238)
0.700
(0.484)

10

9
1
0

Panel B: Natural gas
Full"
Mean adjusted'
Reduced**

4
0

Panel C: Trucking
Full"
Mean adjusted'
Reduced**

2
0

‘Z-statistics (p-values in parentheses).
"Full model : CAR;, = ao+aiDiq+a2UEiq+a3UEiq*D;q+a4UE;q*D;q* (1/Tiq)
+a5RVLi,+a6UEi,*PERjq+a7ÜEiq*INT,.,+agUEi,*BETAi,+U,.,.
'Mean adjusted model : CARj, = ag+a(Djq+a^UEjq+agUEjq*0;^
+a,UE;/Di/(l/Tiq) +a5RVLi,+asUEi,* (PERi„-MPERi) +a7ÜEi,* (INT;,-MINTi)
+agUE,-,* (BETAjq-MBETAj) +U;,.
■•Reduced model : CAR;, = ao+a,Diq+a2UEiq+a3UEiq*Di<,+a4UE,„*Diq* (1/T,„)
+ajRVLiq+Uiq

.
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controlling for the effects of covariates, no evidence is
found for a change in the magnitude of ERCs due to
deregulation or for an intertemporal variation of ERCs
following deregulation for the three industries
investigated in this study.
It can be noted from the results presented so far
that the coefficient to test the intertemporal variation
of ERCs following deregulation (a^) is not significant in
any of the regression models examined.

As indicated in

chapter three an alternative specification where a dummy
variable which equals one for the first ten quarters in
the post-deregulation period and equals zero otherwise is
also used to test the change in ERCs after deregulation.
In this model specification, a step function, instead of a
reciprocal function used previously, is used to model the
intertemporal variation of ERCs following deregulation.
Table

6

sample.

presents the results of the analysis for the full
It can be noted that a< is again not significantly

different from zero for any of the three model
specifications for either pooled or firm-specific
regressions.

On the other hand, the change in ERCs due to

deregulation (a^+a^) is significantly negative when the
reduced model pooled regression is estimated.

However,

this significant reduction in the magnitude of ERCs is
again not found when control variables are included in the
regression models.

Furthermore, a^+a^ is not significantly
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Table 6
Results of various pooled and firm-specific regressions
for the full sample. (A step function is used to model the
intertemporal variation of ERCs following deregulation.)
Panel A: Pooled
as+a/
Full"

a/

Maximum
condition index

-0.105
(0.513)

-0.030
(0.721)

39

Mean adjusted** -0.221
(0.191)

-0.063
(0.444)

12

Reduced"

-0.071
(0.265)

5

-0.212
(0.000)

Panel B: Firm-specific
a3+a4'>
Full"

a,"

Number of
regressions
with condition
indexes > 30

-0.644
(0.520)

0.172
(0.863)

34

Mean adjusted** -0.644
(0.520)

0.172
(0.863)

5

Reduced"

0.106
(0.916)

1

-0.525
(0.600)

‘Parameter estimates (p-values in parentheses).
'’Z-statistics (p-values in parentheses) .
"Full model : CARj, = ao+aiDjq+a2UE,,,+a3UEiq*Diq+a4UEi,*Diq*Eiq+a5RVLiq
+a6UEi,*PERi,+a7ÜEi,*INTi,+agUEiq*BETAi,+Ui,.
‘‘Mean adjusted model : CAR;, = ao+aiDjq+a2UEiq+a3UE,q*D,v,
+a4UE;q*D;q*Eiq+a3RVLiq+agUE;q* (PERj^-MPERj) ta^U Ei,* (IN T iq -M IN T j)

tagUEjq* (BETAjq-MBETAi) +Uj,.
"Reduced model : CAR,,, = ao+aiD;q+a2UEjq+a3UE;q*D;q+a4UE;q*D|q*Ejq
tagRVLiq+Ujq.
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different from zero for any of the three firm-specific
regression models.
The results of pooled regressions for samples
disaggregated by industry are presented in table 7.

It

can be noted that a^ is again not significantly different
from zero for any of the three model specifications for
any of the three industries.

On the other hand, a^+a^ is

significantly negative when reduced model pooled
regressions are estimated for both the airline sample and
the natural gas sample.

However, a^+a^ is not

significantly different from zero for either the full or
the mean adjusted model.

For the trucking sample, a^+a^ is

not significant for any of the three model specifications.
The results of firm-specific regressions for individual
industry samples are presented in table

8

.

Neither a^+a^

nor a^ is significantly different from zero for any of the
three model specifications for any of the three industry
samples.

In summary, after controlling for the effects of

covariates, no evidence is found for a change in the
magnitude of ERCs due to deregulation or for an
intertemporal variation of ERCs following deregulation.
Hypothesis three examines the differential effects of
deregulation on ERCs for the three industries
investigated.

The changes in the magnitude of ERCs due to

deregulation are compared pairwise among the three
industries.

Table 9 presents the results of the analysis
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Table 7
Results of various pooled regressions for seumples
disaggregated by industry. (A step function is used to
model the intertemporal variation of ERCs following
deregulation.)
Panel A: Airline
as+a/
Full”
Mean adjusted'
Reduced**

a/

Maximum
condition

-0 . 2 0 2
(0.479)
-0 . 2 1 1
(0.463)
-0.215
(0.027)

-0.059
(0.653)
-0.058
(0.661)
-0.089
(0.282)

47

-0.036
(0.917)'
-0.223
(0.534)'
-0.675
(0.007)'

0.676
(0.296)'
0.638
(0.328)'
0.283
(0.646)'

33

-0.491
(0.292)
-0.700
(0.125)
0.013
(0.913)

-0.009
(0.973)

48

15
6

Panel B : Natural gas
Full”
Mean adjusted'
Reduced"*

8

7

Panel C: Trucking
Full”
Mean adjusted'
Reduced**

0 . 0 0 2

(0.995)
0.023
(0.934)

15
6

“Parameter estimates (p-values in parentheses).
•’Full model : CAR;, = ao+a;D;q4-a2UE;q+a3UEiq*D;q+a^UEk,*Diq*E;q+a;RVL;q
+a6UEi,*PERiq+a7 UE,.,*INT,„+agUEi,*BETAi,+Ui,.
“Mean adjusted model : CARj, = ao+aiDiq+a2UE;q+a3UE,,,*Diq
+a4 UEi,*Di,*Ei,+a5RVLiq+a6UE.„* (PER,,-MPERi) +a7ÜE;,* (INTj^-MINT;)
+agUE;,* (BETAiq-MBETAi) +U;,.
‘‘Reduced model : CAR,-, = ao+aiDiq+a2UEiq+a3UEiq*Diq+a4UEiq*D,q*Ei,
+a5RVL;q+Ujq .
'These p-values are determined using White's (1980)
heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix since the
null hypothesis that the errors are homoskedastic is
rejected at the 0.05 level (the chi-square statistics are
62.2, 56.3, and 27.9 for the full, the mean adjusted, and
the reduced models respectively).
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Table 8
Results of various firm-specific regressions for samples
disaggregated by industry. (A step function is used to
model the intertemporal variation of ERCs following
deregulation.)

Panel A: Airlines
Full'’
Mean adjusted'
Reduced''

as+a/

a/

Number of
regressions
with condition
indexes > 3 0

-0.209
(0.834)
-0.209
(0.834)
-0.393
(0.694)

-0.993
(0.321)
-0.993
(0.321)
-1.413
(0.158)

9

-0.661
(0.509)
-0.661
(0.509)
-0.263
(0.793)

1.822
(0.068)
1.822
(0.068)
1.795
(0.073)

15

-0.171
(0.864)
-0.171
(0.864)
-0.276
(0.783)

-1.041
(0.298)
-1.041
(0.298)
-0.731
(0.465)

10

1
0

Panel B: Natural gas
Puli'*
Mean adjusted'
Reduced**

2
1

Panel C: Trucking
Full'’
Mean adjusted'
Reduced**

2

0

‘Z-statistics (p-values in parentheses).
■’Full model : CAR;, = ao+aiDiq+a2UEi,+a3UE,q*D;q+a4UE,,,*Diq*Ei<,+a5RVL,-q
+a6UEiq*PERi,+a7UE..,*INT,.,+agUE;,*BETAi,+Ui,.
'Mean adjusted model : CARj, = ao+aiD;q+a2UE;q+a3UE^*D;q
+a4UE;q*Diq*Eiq+a;RVL;q+agUEiq* (PERjq-MPER;) ta ^ U E ;/ (IN T jq -M IN T ;)
tagUEiq* (BETAjq-MBETAi) +U ^.

'Reduced model : CAR,-, = ao+a,D;q+a2UE;q+a3UE;q*D;q+a4UE;q*D;q*Ejq
+a;RVL;q+Uiq .
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when a reciprocal function is used to model the
intertemporal variation of ERCs following deregulation.
Panel A provides the results of comparing parameter
estimates from pooled regressions.

One of the comparisons

shows a significant difference in the changes in ERCs due
to deregulation between two industries.

This is the case

where there is a significant decrease in ERCs for the
natural gas sample and an essentially no change in ERCs
for the trucking sample.

However, this significant

difference in the changes in ERCs due to deregulation is
not found when control variables are included in the
regression model.

Panel B provides the results of

comparing the z-statistics of parameter estimates
aggregated from firm-specific regressions.

None of the

comparisons of the z-statistics shows significant
differences in the changes in ERCs due to deregulation
among the three industries.
Table 10 presents the results of the analysis when a
step function is used to model the intertemporal variation
of ERCs following deregulation.

Similar to the results

presented in table 9, a significant difference in the
changes in ERCs due to deregulation is found between
natural gas and trucking sample firms but again only when
reduced model pooled regressions are estimated.

In

summary, from the results presented in tables 9 and 10 it
can be concluded that after controlling for the effects of
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Table 9
Results of pairwise comparisons of the changes in ERCs due
to deregulation (a^+a^ in the regressions) among the three
industries.* (A reciprocal function is used to model the
intertemporal variation of ERCs following deregulation.)
Panel A: Comparisons of parameter estimates from pooled
regressions (p-values in parentheses).
Air-Gas

Air-Truck

Gas-Truck

Full”

-0.073
(0.909)

0.053
(0.921)

0.126
(0 .8 6 6 )

Mean adjusted”

-0.081
(0.904)

0.158
(0.773)

0.239
(0.758)

Reduced**

0.790
(0.095)

-0.427
(0.172)

-1.217
(0.013)

Panel B: Comparisons of z-statistics of parameter
estimates aggregated from firm-specific regressions
(p-values in parentheses).
Air-Gas

Air-Truck

Gas-Truck

Full”

-0.382
(0.787)

0.107
(0.939)

0.489
(0.729)

Mean adjusted”

-0.382
(0.787)

0.107
(0.939)

0.489
(0.729)

Reduced**

—0 . 6 8 8
(0.627)

-1.032
(0.465)

-0.344
(0.808)

T h e three industries are: Air = airline; Gas = natural
gas; Truck = trucking.
'’Full model : CAR;, = ao+aiDi,+a2ÜEi,+a3UE,,,*Di,+a4UEiq*Diq* (1/T,-,)
+a5RVLi,+a6ÜEi,*PERi,+a7UEi,*INT,„+agTJE,,,*BETA,,+Ui,.
‘’Mean adjusted model : CAR,,, = ao+aiDiq+a2UEi,+a3UEj<,*Diq
+a4UEi,*Di,* (1/T,q) +a;RVLiq+agUEiq* (PER,„-MPERi) H-a^UEj,* (INT;,-MINTi)
+agUEi,* (BETAiq-MBETAj) +0 ;,.
‘‘Reduced model : CAR,,, = ao+a,Diq+a2UE;q4-a3UE;q*D;q+a4UEjq*D;q* (1/T;q)
tasRVLiq+Ujq.
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Table 10
Results of pairwise comparisons of the changes in ERCs due
to deregulation (a^+a^ in the regressions) among three
industries.* (A step function is used to model the
intertemporal variation of ERCs following deregulation.)
Panel A: Comparisons of parameter estimates from pooled
regressions (p-values in parentheses).

Full'’
Mean adjusted'
Reduced'*

Air-Gas

Air-Truck

Gas-Truck

-0.166
(0.711)

0.289
(0.596)

0.455
(0.433)

0 . 0 1 2

(0.979)

0.489
(0.364)

0.477
(0.411)

0.460
(0.088)

-0.228
(0.138)

-0 . 6 8 8
(0.014)

Panel B: Comparisons of z-statistics of parameter
estimates aggregated from firm-specific regressions
(p-values in parentheses).
Air-Gas

Air-Truck

Gas-Truck

Full'’

0.452
(0.749)

-0.038
(0.978)

-0.490
(0.729)

Mean Adjusted'

0.452
(0.749)

-0.038
(0.978)

-0.490
(0.729)

Reduced'*

-0.130
(0.927)

-0.117
(0.934)

0.013
(0.993)

T h e three industries are: Air = airline; Gas = natural
gas; Truck = trucking.
'
’Full model : CARj, = ao+aiD;q+a2UE;q+a3UE;q*D;q+a4UEk,*D^*E;q+a;RVLiq
tagUEj/PERiq+a^UEi/INTiq+agUEi/BETAiq+Ujq.
'Mean adjusted model : CAR,,, = ag+a,Djq+a^UEjq+a^UEjq*0;^
ta^ U E i/D i/E iq + aiR V E iq + ag U E i/ (PERj„-MPERi) +a7ÜEi,* (IN T j^ -M IN T i)

tagUEiq* (BETAiq-MBETAj) +U;q.
‘‘Reduced model : CAR,-q = ao+a,D|q+a2UEiq+a3UEjq*D;q+a4UE;q*D;q*E;q
+a;RVLiq+Ujq .
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covariates, no evidence of a differential effect of
deregulation on ERCs is found among the three industries
examined in this study.
Summary
This chapter reports the results of the study.

The

first section discusses the results of the sample
selection.

The sample consists of 35 firms.

Nine of them

are airlines, sixteen are natural gas firms, and the
remaining ten are trucking firms.

The second section

presents the results of the tests of research hypotheses.
Reductions in the magnitude of ERCs due to deregulation
are found in the airline and natural gas industries but
only when reduced model pooled regressions are estimated.
No evidence of an intertemporal variation of ERCs
following deregulation is found.

Significant differences

in the changes in ERCs among the three industries examined
are found only when reduced model pooled regressions are
estimated.

Therefore, the overall conclusion is that

after controlling for the effects of covariates, no
evidence is found for a significant impact of deregulation
on ERCs.“

"The influence diagnostics procedures suggested by
Belsley et al. (1980) are used to identify influential
observations in various pooled regression models.
Approximately one percent of the observations are
identified as outliers.
Pooled regression models are
estimated after deleting these observations. The overall
conclusion of the study is not altered.
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CHAPTER FIVE
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This chapter contains a summary of the study and the
conclusions reached.

Section one provides a brief

overview of the study.

The second section discusses the

expected findings of the study.
presented in section three.
conclusions.

Results of the study are

Section four contains the

The chapter closes with discussions of the

limitations of the study and suggestions for future
research.
Overview of the Studv
Many sectors of the United Stated economy have
experienced deregulation during the 1970s and 1980s.

This

study examines how deregulation affects the
informativeness of accounting earnings of firms in
deregulation industries.

In this study, the

informativeness of accounting earnings is measured by the
ERCs.

The effects of deregulation on ERCs are examined

by: (1) comparing ERCs before deregulation to those after
deregulation to determine the changes in the magnitude of
ERCs due to deregulation,

(2) investigating the time

series of ERCs after deregulation to determine the
intertemporal variation of ERCs following deregulation,
and (3) comparing the change in ERCs in one deregulated
71

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

72
industry to that in another deregulated industry to
determine the differential effects of deregulation.
Three industries (airline, natural gas, and trucking)
that were deregulated in the late 1970s and early 1980s
are examined.

Sample firms in these industries are

obtained from the Value Line Investment Survey.
Regression models are estimated to test the hypothesized
effects of deregulation on ERCs.

Variables found to be

determinants of ERCs in previous research are included in
some of the regression models to control for the effects
of these variables on ERCs.
Expectations
As applied to the context of this study, the
theoretical models of Choi (1985), Holthausen and
Verrecchia (1988), and Lev (1989) suggest that ERCs are
positively related to the uncertainty associated with the
future cash flows and negatively related to the variance
of the noise in the earnings signals.

Based on the

arguments of Peltzman (1976), deregulation is expected to
lead to a higher level of uncertainty, but deregulation is
not expected to lead to noisier earnings signals.
Therefore, larger ERCs are expected after deregulation.
Lang (1991) suggests that the magnitude of the stock
price responses to earnings is a positive function of the
degree of uncertainty about the time series parameters of
earnings.

Deregulation subjects firms to a relatively new
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environment.

Earnings numbers before deregulation will

not necessarily reflect what can be expected following
deregulation.

Thus, after deregulation, uncertainty about

the future prospects for the firm will be relatively high.
As a longer series of earnings numbers after deregulation
becomes available, uncertainty decreases and the magnitude
of the stock price responses to earnings decreases.
Therefore, ERCs are expected to decline over time
following deregulation.
The increase in the uncertainty about a firm's future
cash flows due to deregulation should depend on the scope
and extent of deregulation.

However, other factors (e.g.,

the ability of deregulated firms to cope with the changes
in their operating environment) can also affect the
magnitude of the increase in the uncertainty induced by
deregulation.

Therefore, no expectation is formed as to

the order of the magnitude of the increase in ERCs of the
three industries examined in this study.
Results
Hypothesis one examines the changes in the magnitude
of ERCs due to deregulation.

Contrary to expectations,

reductions in the magnitude of ERCs are found in the
airline and natural gas industries when reduced model
pooled regressions are estimated.

However, after

controlling for the effects of covariates, no evidence of
a change in the magnitude of ERCs due to deregulation is
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found.

Hypothesis two examines the intertemporal

variation of ERCs following deregulation.

No evidence of

an intertemporal variation of ERCs following deregulation
is found.

Hypothesis three examines the differential

effects of deregulation on ERCs for the three industries
investigated in this study.

Significant differences in

the changes in ERCs among the three industries are found
only when reduced model pooled regressions are estimated.
Therefore, after controlling for the effects of
covariates, no evidence of a differential effect of
deregulation on ERCs is found.
Conclusions
After controlling for the effects of covariates, no
evidence is found for a significant impact of deregulation
on ERCs.

This result is surprising given the expected

increase in uncertainty associated with the future cash
flows induced by deregulation and the positive correlation
between ERCs and uncertainty in the models developed by
Choi (1985), Holthausen and Verrecchia (1989), and Lev
(1989).

However, there could be offsetting factors.

First, in the aforementioned models, ERCs are decreasing
functions of the noise in the earnings signals, and
deregulation may have increased this noise.

Second,

deregulation reduces industry barriers to entry and Biddle
and Seow (1991) find evidence consistent with a positive
correlation between ERCs and these same barriers.
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Furthermore, factors other than those included in this
study could affect the magnitude of ERCs and could (at
least partially) be responsible for the reported results.
Limitations
Certain limitations of the study must be recognized.
First, evidence regarding the impact of (or in this case
the lack thereof) deregulation on ERCs must be handled
carefully.

In order to determine the "true" impact of

deregulation, one will have to know what would have
happened without deregulation, and that is impossible.
Second, even though deregulation dates are determined
after reviewing legislative history and prior studies, the
determination process is inherently subjective.

Third, by

including only firms followed by the Value Line, this
study focuses on large and widely held firms.

Therefore,

the findings of this study may not be generalizable to
other firms.

Finally, multicollinearity is a concern in

interpreting the results of the study especially those of
the full model regressions— though, it should not a
problem for the mean adjusted or the reduced model pooled
regressions.
Suggestions for Future Research
There are several suggestions for related future
research.

First, the regression models used in this study

contain only a few variables that could have affected the
stock market responses to earnings announcements.
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controlling for other firm characteristics or
macroeconomic variables could be constructed to
investigate the impact of deregulation.

Second, a

reciprocal and a step function are used in this study to
model the intertemporal variation of ERCs following
deregulation, other model specifications could certainly
be used.

Third, this study examines the impact of

deregulation on ERCs on an industry level.

Future

research could investigate the impact of deregulation on a
firm level.

Individual firms may be affected by

deregulation differently.

If these effects are offsetting

then they could be masked in an industry level study.
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